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ABSTRACT
Application of NTRU Cryptographic Algorithm for securing SCADA
Communication
by
Amritha Puliadi Premnath
Dr. Ju-Yeon Jo, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Computer Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is a control system
which is widely used in Critical Infrastructure System to monitor and control
industrial processes autonomously. Most of the SCADA communication protocols
are vulnerable to various types of cyber-related attacks. The currently used security
standards for SCADA communication specify the use of asymmetric cryptographic
algorithms like RSA or ECC for securing SCADA communications. There are
certain performance issues with cryptographic solutions of these specifications when
applied to SCADA system with real-time constraints and hardware limitations. To
overcome this issue, in this thesis we propose the use of a faster and light-weighted
NTRU cryptographic algorithm for authentication and data integrity in securing
SCADA communication. Experimental research conducted on ARMv6 based
Raspberry Pi and Intel Core machine shows that cryptographic operations of NTRU
is two to thirty five times faster than the corresponding RSA or ECC. Usage of
NTRU algorithm reduces computation and memory overhead significantly making it
suitable for SCADA systems with real-time constraints and hardware limitations.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Critical Infrastructure represents the basic facilities, services and installations
necessary for functioning of a community, such as water, power lines,
transportation, communication systems, and so on. Any act or practice that causes a
real-time Critical Infrastructure System to impair its normal function and
performance will have debilitating impact on security and economy, with direct
implication on the society. Critical infrastructure system operation involves the
exchange of real-time data from various distributed control systems along the local
and wide area communication networks to support a variety of vital mechanisms. To
enable such mechanisms messages have to be delivered in a secure and timely
manner using a cost-efficient and compatible communication protocol.
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system [19] is a control
system which is predominantly used in Critical Infrastructure System to monitor and
control industrial processes autonomously. SCADA can be seen as a combination of
hardware, software, controllers, networks and computers that assist in the remote
monitoring and co-ordination of control systems of an adverse infrastructure like
smart grids, chemical plants, transportation systems etc. These systems have been in
use from 1960’s. Ever since then SCADA has been gradually evolving along with
new upcoming technologies making it more flexible, yet more vulnerable.
SCADA systems previously designed were connected to limited private network.
There was no need of protecting such closed architecture against any cyber-attack.
They were designed to be tolerant towards few human errors that were very low in
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severity. The SCADA system used today is easily affected by cyber-attacks due to
the arrival of IP technologies and standards into the design of such systems. This
integration supports new IT capabilities, but it provides significantly less isolation
for SCADA systems from the outside world than predecessor systems, creating a
greater need to secure these systems. SCADA provides automation solutions using
several standards such as the IEC-61850 [11], DNP3 [12], IEC 60870-5 [13] and
Modbus [14]. Most of these protocols run over unsecure TCP/IP networks using
high speed switched Ethernet to obtain necessary response times. It is therefore
imperative that system security and risk mitigation be at the forefront of the minds
of all SCADA system users.
1.1 Need for Current Work
Encryption and authentication are highly effective methods to reduce some of these
cyber threats to SCADA communications. Recently, there have been several efforts
to secure the SCADA systems. Security communities have been trying to make
security policies, operational, quality and system recommendations to provide
security systems for SCADA infrastructure. There are two open standards for
SCADA communications available on the market today that were developed to
provide security through encryption and authentication: IEC 62351suite [6 and 11]
and IEEE6189 suite (also known as AGA-12 incorporated in IEEE 1711), these
standards secure SCADA equipment communication [3]. However there have been
few noted performance issues in meeting the timing requirements of utilities such as
smart grid and water companies, while implementing IEC 62351 and AGA-12
[1 and 15].
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AGA-12 and IEC 62351 standards approve the use of asymmetric algorithms such
as RSA [16] and ECC [17] for digital signing which is used for authentication
purposes. Unfortunately in practical, some SCADA applications involving delay
constraints limit their security to just authentication. They don’t adopt any
encryption technique to secure the integrity of the message as the digital signing
process using RSA is time consuming and process intensive [15]. Also there are
number of insecure connections in the SCADA network unprotected with the
absence of authentication and encryption [4] (due to the expensive asymmetric
cryptographic operations), e.g. ports used for maintenance of SCADA system,
examination of the SCADA system, obtaining remote access to the system etc. Such
devices or applications and the communication channel it uses is highly susceptible
to attacks and hence results in compromise of the integrity of data transmitted.
Although ECC based authentication mechanisms can provide better performance
results when compared to RSA, in practical it is necessary to consider algorithms
faster than ECC for real-time applications. The objective of this thesis is to provide a
better solution for SCADA device/channel authentication and data integrity by
introducing the use of faster and light-weighted NTRU cryptographic, rather than
the currently used slow RSA or comparatively slow ECC.
Our experiments were performed on ARMv6 based Raspberry Pi and Intel
machine running Windows 7 for evaluating the performance of different asymmetric
cryptosystems. Our results show that usage of a light-weight asymmetric key
protocol like NTRU is necessary for supporting a secure and faster real-time critical
application.

3

1.2 Outline
Chapter 2 gives a general background of the SCADA architecture, advantages of
using internet-based SCADA systems and an overview of SCADA Communication
protocols. Chapter 3 discusses the need for SCADA security and the common
attacks it encounters.

Chapter 4 gives a brief introduction on the role of

cryptography in SCADA security and practical difficulties involved in implementing
them. Chapter 5 discusses about the NTRU cryptographic algorithm and the
proposed approach of applying it to improve the security standards of SCADA
system. Chapter 6 subsequently describes about our experimentation on Raspberry
Pi and Intel Core Machines to evaluate and compare the performance of NTRU with
RSA & ECC cryptographic operations and discuss our findings. Chapter 7 gives the
conclusion and the improvements that can be made in the future.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter gives an overview of SCADA architecture, advantage of using Internet
based SCADA system and overview of the SCADA communication protocols
2.1 SCADA Architecture
SCADA is an acronym for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, which is a
computer-based control system that is used for collecting and analyzing real-time
data. SCADA systems are designed to collect field information, transfer it to a
central computer facility, and display the information to the operator graphically or
textually, thereby allowing the operator to monitor or control an entire system from
a central location in real time. Based on the sophistication and setup of the
individual system, control of any individual system, operation, or task can be
automatic, or it can be performed by operator commands.
The basic SCADA architecture consists of following fundamental components:
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)
RTU’s are microprocessor based devices deployed in the field at specific sites and
locations to support SCADA remote stations. They serve as local collection points
gathering information for the control center, from field control devices remotely and
issue commands to the field control system. Control devices are components like
sensors, actuators, electric motors, console lights, switches, and valves etc. that are
deployed in the field to perform and control local operation. Local operation can
involve data collection from sensor systems, opening and closing of valves, turning
on and off of switches and so on.
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Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC)
The PLC is a small industrial computer originally designed to perform the logic
functions executed by electrical hardware (relays, drum switches, and mechanical
timer/counters). PLCs have evolved into controllers with the capability of
controlling complex processes, and they are used substantially in SCADA systems.
They provide the same control as RTU except that RTUs are designed for specific
control applications.
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED)
An IED is a “smart” sensor/actuator containing the intelligence required to acquire
data, communicate to other devices, and perform local processing and control. An
IED could combine an analog input sensor, analog output, low-level control
capabilities, a communication system, and program memory in one device. The use
of IEDs in SCADA systems allows for automatic control at the local level.
Master Terminal Unit (MTU)
The Master units (MTUs) serve as the central processor of the SCADA system.
They monitor and control large number of RTUs/PLCs. They acquire information
from RTU’s/PLC’s, carryout necessary analysis and control; provide the reading and
equipment details to the human operators through HMI. In an internet-based
SCADA network, the MTU’s can be on a different network or location.
Human Machine Interface (HMI)
HMI is a computer system that runs powerful graphics for displaying status and
historical information to operators. Human operators use HMIs to configure set
points, control algorithms, and adjust and establish parameters in the field control
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devices remotely by observing the readings and sending instructions to specific
RTU’s.
Communication Network
One of the most important elements of the SCADA system is the communication
network which acts as a bridge between the control systems. SCADA
communication is conducted over leased lines/switched telephone, wide area
network/internet, radio/microwave and satellite.

Figure 2.1 Basic SCADA Architecture

Figure 2.1 shows a basic SCADA architecture which is interconnected with the
internet. The traditional proprietary and closed SCADA architecture cannot meet
the ever-changing requirements of Critical Infrastructure Industry. Internet based
architecture is highly essential to provide an ideal and flexible platform for this
constantly changing business.
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2.1.1 Advantages of using Internet-based SCADA Architecture
We come across many companies that have leveraged internet for their SCADA
systems, either by building new applications from scratch or by enabling internet
accessibility to the existing SCADA systems. The major reasons that motivates
companies to adopt IP technologies into their SCADA design include,


It reduces the infrastructure cost, as they have the benefit of using public
Internet instead of using the expensive dedicated lines.



It allows them to access information in an easier way from remote sites and
assists in improving system efficiency and performance.



It provides immediate access to real-time data.



It reduces the cost involved in repairing and other labor costs required for
troubleshooting or service when a dedicated line fails.



It facilitates compliance with regulatory agencies through automated report
generating from remote equipment.



It is more flexible in terms of choosing equipment and systems based on
price/performance rather than compatibility with installed base.



It supports scalability quickly from few sites to thousands.

2.2 SCADA Communication Standards and Trends
The information/control signals exchanged between SCADA devices and other
control systems through a network, or other media is governed by rules and
conventions that can be set out in technical specifications called Communication
protocols standards.
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2.2.1 SCADA Communication Protocols
Protocol designs in SCADA are compact and are so designed as to send information
to MTU only in case the RTU is polled for information by the MTU. Typical legacy
SCADA protocols include Modbus RTU, ASCII, RP-570, Profibus and Conitel.
These communication protocols are all SCADA-vendor specific. Standard protocols
are IEC 60870-5-101 or 104, IEC 61850 and DNP3 [13]. These communication
protocols are standardized and recognized by all major SCADA vendors.
Communication protocols with extensions can operate in internet protocol TCP/IP.
For e.g. Modbus TCP/IP has now become standard for lot of hardware
manufacturers and is widely accepted communication protocol. Although it is
advisable not to connect it to internet and expose it to risk, Ethernet TCP/IP has
found its way into industrial automation breaking the barriers in majority of SCADA
market.
The following protocols are emerging as virtual standards in modern SCADA
systems.
2.2.1.1 Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3)
DNP3 is a protocol that defines communications between master stations, remote
terminal units (RTUs), and IEDs in SCADA. IEEE has opted DNP3 as a standard
for Electric power system communications [12]. It is also widely used in water
infrastructure, oil, gas, security and other industries. Initially, DNP3 was designed
without any security features. DNP3 is extended to DNP3 Secure Authentication
(SA) [26], which was designed to meet requirements of IEC 62351-5. DNP3-SA
employs techniques including symmetric cryptography and hashed message
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authentication codes (HMACs).Implementation presumes that both master station
and outstation share a common secret key, called an update key, which is used to
generate a session key. The recently released DNP3-SA5 reinforces overall security
for data information gathering, exchange, and use in SCADA systems.
Network Architecture: DNP3 was initially designed with four layers: physical,
data link, transport and application layer. Originally physical layer involved serial
communication protocols such as RS-232, RS-422 or RS-485. Today’s DNP3 has
been ported over TCP/IP layer to support recent communication technologies, and
thus can be considered as three-layer network protocol operating upon the TCP/IP
layer[27] to support end-to-end communications. Figure 2.2 shows DNP3 protocol
wrapped inside TCP/IP data packet.

Figure 2.2 DNP3 with TCP
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2.2.1.2 IEC 61850
IEC 61850 was published as a standard by IEC (International Electrochemical
Commission) for Substation Automation system. It was created to be an
internationally standardized method of communication and integration to support
systems built from IEDs and RTUs independent of the device manufacturer. It also
defines certain performance classes for different communication methods. Table 2.1
shows a list of delay requirements for IEC 61850 messages, which reveals that
power substation communication contains a number of time-critical messages with
application layer delay constraints varying from 3ms to 500ms.

Message Type

Delay Constraints(ms)

Type 1A/P1

3

Type 1A/P2

10

Type 1B/P1

100

Type 1B/P2

20

Type 2

100

Type 3

500

Table 2.1 Timing Requirements for messages in power substations

Network Architecture: Differing from DNP3 that is based on TCP/IP, IEC 61850
specifies a series of protocol stacks for variety of services including TCP/IP,
UDP/IP, and an application-to-MAC stack for time-critical messages.
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Any security standard that attempts to secure IEC 61850 based traffic must take
into consideration of these performance requirements.
2.2.1.3 IEC 60870-5
IEC 60870-5 provides a communication profile for sending basic tele-control
messages between two systems, which uses permanent directly connected data
circuits between the systems. It is one of the widely accepted standards in Electric
power systems that enable interoperability among compatible tele-control
equipment.
2.3 Overview of IEC 62351
For some years now, Critical infrastructure systems using SCADA architecture have
been attempting to secure the different protocols it uses. This push for security is
mainly due to the movement from “point to point” communication between devices
to large TCP/IP networks. This resulted in the emergence of IEC 62351 series. Its
primary objective was to undertake the development of standards for security of the
communication protocols defined by IEC TC 57, specifically IEC 61850, IEC
60870-5 series and its derivatives (i.e., DNP3).However, the current scope of IEC
62351 is aimed at defining numerous mechanisms to protect exchange of
information in automation applications [6]. The major goal of this standardization is
to provide end-to-end security in power automation systems. Table 2.2 IEC 62351
specification covering different OSI layers. Some IEC 62351-3 standards are as
follows:
• IEC 62351-3 identifies how to ensure secure TCP/IP-based protocols using
transport layer security (TLS).
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• IEC 62351-5 defines security for IEC 60870-5 and its derivatives, providing
different solutions for serial and networked versions. It uses TLS for TCP/IP
profiles and encryption for serial profiles. It specifies how to incorporate user
and device authentication, and data integrity. Existing protocols like DNP3 has
been extended to meet the authentication requirements of IEC 62351-5.
• IEC 62351-6 provides security for IEC 61850 profiles.

OSI Layers

Part

Scope

3

Profiles Including TCP

4

Profiles Including MMS

5

Security for IEC 60870-5 and Derivatives

X X X X

6

Security for IEC 61850 Profiles

X X

9

Cyber security key management for power

1

X
X

X

X X X X

system equipment
11

2 3 4 5-7

Security for XML Files(Pending)

X

Table 2.2 IEC 62351 covering different layers of OSI model

Besides power systems, other SCADA systems, and other critical infrastructure
systems can deploy the specified security measures in IEC 62351 because they have
several common requirements.
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CHAPTER 3
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR SCADA COMMUNICATION
This chapter focuses on the need for securing SCADA communication and common
threats associated with SCADA network.
3.1 Need for securing SCADA Communication
Traditional SCADA systems were designed to be closed networks; they were
separated from other enterprise or public networks. They also used proprietary
hardware, software and network protocols which increased the difficulty of
understanding SCADA systems. So security was not considered as a big issue.
However due to advent of internet-based communication, today more
organizations connect SCADA networks with other potentially unsecure networks to
leverage the benefits listed before. Although it looks beneficial, several attacks have
been reported in this modern internet-based SCADA system. According to the latest
ICS-CERT (Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response team) report in
the first-half of fiscal year 2013, over 200 attempted intrusions were detected. From
Figure 3.1 highest percentage of incidents were reported in the energy sector at 53%.
Due to the internet, technical information needed to attack these systems is widely
discussed making the SCADA system even more vulnerable. Critical security flaws
have become well known to potential hackers. It is feared that SCADA systems can
be victimized by hackers, criminals or terrorists.
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Figure 3.1 Percentage of incidents reported across all Critical Infrastructure
sectors (Oct, 2012 – May, 2013)

3.1.1 Risk Factors associated with SCADA Architecture
During the analysis for providing a secure SCADA communication, few factors
were reported to have contributed to the escalation of risk to SCADA system. Those
include:


Usage of standardized technologies whose vulnerabilities are well known to
attackers. For e.g. nine out of ten SCADA systems use Windows, others use
Unix-like operating system. Attackers are knowledgeable in these
technologies, so it becomes easier for them to wage attacks on these systems.



Insecure connections: The communication link that most SCADA enterprise
uses (e.g. leased line, internet, wide area network etc.) to transmit data
between control systems and remote locations, could be easily compromised.



Readily available technical information about control systems: Internet is
flooded with information on infrastructures and control systems. Hackers and
attackers use this information to understand about the system and find ways
to attack them.
15



Sometimes control systems which are installed incorrectly might also act as a
threat as they can bridge networks together unintentionally.



In par with an external threat, there is also the risk of internal threat where an
attack is caused by an employee who has greater access to the SCADA
control systems.

Figure 3.2 Points of vulnerability in a SCADA network- Example

As a consequence of all these issues and as attackers are becoming more
sophisticated in performing cyber-related criminal and terrorist activities, there is an
urgent need for providing high-quality cost-efficient security for SCADA
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communication. Figure 3.2 shows a security compromised SCADA network and the
potential points of vulnerability.
3.2 Attacks in SCADA Communication - Classification
Current SCADA devices are effective in detecting and preventing well-known
Internet attacks, but until recently they have not addressed SCADA communication
protocol attacks completely. SCADA vendors are beginning to develop and
incorporate attack signatures [18] for various SCADA protocols such as Modbus,
IEC-61850, and DNP3. Attacks that possibly affect the SCADA communication are
listed below:
Data Integrity Attacks
In SCADA system, attacks that result in modification or destruction of control and
sensing signals/messages is referred to as Data Integrity attacks and any prolonged
loss of data results in Denial of Service (DoS) attack. These attacks could cause the
system to behave in an unstable manner by hijacking its normal operation.


Example – An attacker can make unauthorized changes to programmed
instructions/status values in RTUs, resulting in damage to equipment,
premature shutdown of processes, or even disabling control equipment.

Authentication Attacks
Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of an entity. SCADA system is
vulnerable to an unauthorised party who can send fake messages which may damage
the industrial control process controlled by SCADA. Hence devices have to provide
their identity details for communication. Whenever a SCADA device receives a
command to perform some control, it challenges the sending device for its identity.
17

Only when the receiving device is satisfied with the identity response, it acts upon
the original command.


Example – An attacker can send false information to control system
operators to disguise unauthorized changes or to initiate inappropriate actions
by system operators.

Confidentiality Attacks
Confidentiality attacks in SCADA system are caused by gaining access to sensitive
data, either by eavesdropping on the network (non-secure communication line) or
accessing the repository. Disclosure of sensitive data results in loss or damage to the
entire SCADA system. To protect sensitive data from unauthorized users, data is
encrypted before it is transmitted through an unprotected communication channel
like a public network. Encrypted data becomes meaningless or unintelligible to an
eavesdropper. Only the intended recipient can decrypt the message with the secret
key.


Example 1 – An attacker can over hear a communication between control
systems and can en-route a data exchange by assuming exchanger’s identity.



Example 2 – They can eavesdrop and acquire desired information, such as
customer’s private details.

Non-repudiation Attacks
Non-repudiation is a service that provides proof of integrity and origin of data
thereby assuring an authentication to be genuine. Origin of data is more important in
SCADA communication involving multicast communication.
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Example – An attacker can guess the private key corresponding to the
signing certificate and change the message origin.

The key requirement of a secure SCADA system is to provide solutions to defend
these attacks.
3.3 Attack simulated in Power System
Many vendors use TCP/IP to transport SCADA messages. Link layer frames are
embedded into TCP/IP packets for transmission. This approach has enabled SCADA
architecture to take advantage of Internet technology and allow collecting data
economically and controlling geographically separated devices. This has made the
system more vulnerable to cyber-attacks.
An attack was simulated with a DNP3 simulator to show how an attacker can
modify the data (in this case, increase the current load above 400 amps) without
control center/MTU being notified of the changes. Triangle MicroWorks Protocol
Test Harness Tool was used to perform a data-integrity attack in an electric power
system.
3.3.1 Terminology in Power system
Polling: Polling refers to actively sampling the status of an external device by a
client program as a synchronous activity.
Relay: A relay is an electrically operated switch. Many relays use an electromagnet
to operate a switching mechanism mechanically, but other operating principles are
also used. Relays with calibrated operating characteristics are used to protect
electrical circuits from overload or faults: in modern electric power systems these
functions are performed by digital instruments called “protective relays”.
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3.3.2 Simulation


Figure 3.3 shows RTU simulator that displays the normal current flow with a
closed circuit state. The load current is 200 Amps.

Figure 3.3 RTU displaying normal current flow



MTU keeps monitoring the status of its RTUs and controls it. Figure 3.4
shows the status view as seen from a MTU. It indicates a normal current
flow.
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Figure 3.4 Status view from the MTU



To perform an attack, DNP3 polling was shut down (as seen in Figure 3.5)
and the current load was increased to 400 Amps. As the polling was disabled,
the master station will not receive any status message from the RTU.

Figure 3.5 Polling is Shutdown
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This caused the relay to trip and stopped the current flow which can be seen
in Figure 3.6.

Figure 3.6 RTU showing zero current flow



However, there was no status change in the master view because polling was
not enabled. The status was the same as seen in Figure 3.4.



If the polling had been enabled, the master view would have looked like the
one shown in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7 Master view if polling was not shutdown

This simulation shows what could have happened if an attacker/hacker had turned
off polling. Though it looks like a simple attack, its impact is huge. This has
increased the need for securing a SCADA system. Securing SCADA communication
protocols has been one of the goals of technical specification IEC 62351.
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CHAPTER 4
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOLUTIONS IN SCADA SECURITY
This chapter provides an overview of cryptographic solutions in SCADA security
and discusses on the practical difficulties while implementing those.
4.1 Role of Cryptography in SCADA security
For securing the overall SCADA communication completely the existing SCADA
protocols must ensure to provide end-to-end authentication, data integrity, nonrepudiation and confidentiality [8]. Cryptography is a hidden component of all these
security measures or cyber security policies. NIST [20], IEEE, AGA (American Gas
Association) and many other organisations have been sincerely engaged in
developing cryptographic standards to secure SCADA communication [2, 3, and 4].
Cryptographic primitive approaches are needed in SCADA system to deal with
attacks targeting integrity and confidentiality that cause negligible effect on the
network performance.
4.1.1 Terminology
Encryption and Decryption
Encryption and decryptions are cryptographic methods used to achieve secure
communication and information. Encryption is the conversion of data into a form,
called a cipher text, which cannot be easily understood by unauthorized people.
Decryption is the process of converting encrypted data back into its original form, so
it can be understood by the intended recipient. The design and choice of encryption
scheme is the essential mechanism to protect data confidentiality and integrity in any
SCADA system.
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Cryptosystem
A cryptosystem can be considered as a suite of three algorithms: for key generation,
encryption and decryption. The two primary cryptosystems used are Symmetric and
Asymmetric depending upon the nature of keys used to encrypt a message.

Comparison
Feature
Key Management

Symmetric Cryptosystem

Asymmetric Cryptosystem

Symmetric encryption uses only

Asymmetric encryption uses a

one key that all parties to the

public and a private key. The

message exchange must know, so

owner holds the private key and

the key is the same on either side

never shares it with anyone. The

of the transmission. Complicates

public key is available to anyone

key management as it requires

to decrypt a message from the

secure exchange and update of

owner, and only the owner's

secret keys among the

private key can encrypt the

communication SCADA

message.

systems/devices.
Speed

Key Length

Faster due to simplicity of

Relatively slower than symmetric

algorithm.

algorithms.

Uses shorter key length generally.

Requires longer key lengths to

Requirement
Security Risk

Resource Utilization

achieve a given level of security.
Risk is the disclosure of shared

Less risky since private key is not

key to an unauthorized entity.

shared to anyone.

Requires approximately constant

Requires more computational

computational resources

resources for long key size.

regardless of key size.
Approved

Advanced Encryption

RSA, Elliptic Curve

algorithms for

Standard(AES), Data Encryption

Cryptography(ECC)

SCADA system

Standard (DES), Triple DES

Table 4.1 Comparison of Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptosystem
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Table 4.1 shows a detailed comparison of the two cryptosystems. It is necessary to
determine the appropriate choice of cryptosystem in SCADA communication to
provide a secure end-to-end communication.

Both symmetric and asymmetric

cryptographic solutions have their own advantages and disadvantages. Application
of such solutions in SCADA communication may present design and operational
challenges. So it is necessary to identify appropriate solution for specific SCADA
control system.
IEC 62351 is one of the recommended standards by NIST for securing the
communication between control systems. It is widely adopted in substation
automation system. Table 4.2 shows the different attacks in SCADA system with the
cryptographic solutions proposed by IEC 62351 to handle them.

Type of Attack

Cryptographic Solutions by IEC 62351

Data-Integrity Attack

Symmetric (AES, DES, TDES) and
Asymmetric Encryption algorithms (RSA,
ECC), Hashing algorithms (SHA-1 , SHA-2,
SHA-256)

Authentication Attack

HMAC, Asymmetric Digital Signature schemes

Confidentiality Attack

Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption
algorithms, Asymmetric Digital Signature
schemes

Non-repudiation

Asymmetric Digital Signature schemes

Table 4.2 Cryptographic solutions for different attacks in SCADA
communication
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4.2 Role of Asymmetric Cryptography in SCADA Communication Protocols
Both symmetric and asymmetric based approaches become major counter measures
against such attacks [7]. The following describes the need for asymmetric
cryptography in SCADA communication on two major topics:
4.2.1 In Encryption and Decryption
Encryption & Decryption are elementary cryptographic methods to achieve secure
communication and information protection from unauthorized users. In SCADA
systems, most devices are expected to have at least basic cryptographic capabilities,
including the support for symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. Although
symmetric key encryption is faster and uses less computational resources than
asymmetric counterpart, sharing a common secret key increases the risk for attacks.
For SCADA system involving millions of devices, adopting symmetric counter
measure leads to generation of several keys, one each for a communication with
every different party. Key management becomes difficult and moreover authenticity
of the message cannot be verified. Hence there is a need to use a faster and a light
weight asymmetric encryption scheme in SCADA systems.
4.2.2 In Authentication
It is a system for certifying the origin of a communication or the process for
verifying that an entity or object is who or what it claims to be. Authentication is a
crucial identification process to eliminate attacks targeting data integrity.
Authentication protocols used in SCADA system should be highly efficient, tolerant
to attacks and faults, and also support multicast traffic. Keyed-Hash Message
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Authentication Code (HMAC) [21] and digital signature schemes are the common
authentication mechanisms in SCADA.
Multicast has wide applications in SCADA systems, including monitoring,
protection, and information dissemination e.g. in substation communication systems
[11]. The most straightforward multicast authentication scheme is to use asymmetric
digital signatures, which is also recommended by a recent security standard for
substation communication, IEC 62351.This is mainly because HMAC does not
provide data-origin authentication in multicast traffic. In group traffic, all grouped
members share the same single HMAC key (symmetric key) and hence the identity
of the sender is not uniquely established. Although HMAC provides group-level
security, data-origin authentication is not achieved. Since asymmetric digital
signature uses 2 keys, one which is never shared, it can provide true data-origin
authentication making it a valuable choice.
4.3 Challenges in implementing Cryptographic solutions for SCADA security
It is always necessary to understand the performance impacts for any Critical
infrastructure using SCADA system before introducing any cryptographic solution
for its security. The typical characteristics of SCADA network make it challenging
to adapt cryptographic protocols such as asymmetric cryptosystems into SCADA
systems with limited resources and SCADA systems involving real-time traffic.
Existing cryptographic technologies for authorization, authentication, encryption and
decryption require more bandwidth, processing power and memory than what the
current SCADA device generally has. Hence, the application of cryptographic
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solution to SCADA systems poses significant challenges mainly due to following
constraints.


Limited computational capacity: The remote equipment such as RTUs is
an embedded system having low computational and space capacity.



Low rate data transmission: Since the SCADA system has been used for a
long time, the communication line of the SCADA network has low
bandwidth.



Real-time processing: The SCADA system should behave accurately. Delay
of data processing could cause serious problem.

The difficulty of applying security technology to the system makes the constraints to
be a basic consideration for applying security mechanism.
4.3.1 Performance Issues while implementing IEC 62351
The scope of IEC 62351 lies in the development of standards for security of
communication protocols defined by IEC TC57, IEC 60870-5& 6 series, IEC 61850
series and IEC 61968 series for Substation Automation control systems. They try to
provide the standards for authenticating and encrypting SCADA communication link
in Power system. IEC 62351-3 to IEC 62351-6 provide various levels of protocol
security, depending upon the protocol (e.g. MMS, GOOSE, SMV, DNP3 etc.). IEC
62351 approves the use of the following asymmetric algorithms for providing
cryptographic solutions:


RSA with 2048 bits until 2029



RSA with 3072 bits for CA’s after 2030
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) with curves P-224, K-233 or B-233

until 2029


ECC with curves P-256, P-384, P-521, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-283, B-

409 and B-571 after 2030.
RSA and ECC are the widely recommended algorithms for digital signing.
Embedded SCADA devices/RTU has little computational power and only a small
portion can be made available for protection and control. Some SCADA applications
using protocols like GOOSE and SV have strict real-time constraints.
Currently, IEC 62351 explicitly specifies the use of RSA as a solution to protect
and authenticate time-critical messages. The following issues were found while
implementing IEC 62351 in Substation Automation system.


Software implementation of RSA digital signature scheme did not meet the
real-time requirements with today’s existing RTU’s/IED’s hardware.



RSA requires longer keys in order to be secured compared to other
cryptosystems like ECC. Though a longer key length in itself is not so much
disadvantage, it contributes to slower encryption and decryption which
makes it unsuitable for SCADA applications with real-time constraints. RSA
theory says that for an n-bit key, computational effort for encryption is
proportional to n2, while effort for decryption is proportional to n3.



The delay involved in implementing RSA digital signature schemes, leaves
few devices and communication channel unsecured without adopting any
cryptographic technique for encryption.
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This indicates that although RSA is highly recommended by IEC 62351, its low
computational efficiency indeed affects the communication performance of timecritical applications, which demands the need to consider an alternative new and
faster asymmetric cryptosystem. ECC has attracted increased attention in SCADA
networks over RSA, with few researchers in terms of required key lengths and
processing times. Although ECC provides a better performance over RSA, it is
necessary to consider approaches or techniques faster and secure than ECC for
SCADA real-time applications.
Our research is aimed at overcoming some of the limitations and shortcomings of
the presently specified cryptographic security measures for SCADA real-time
systems and improving their performance by proposing the application of faster and
light-weighted NTRU cryptographic algorithm for SCADA security, over RSA or
ECC.
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CHAPTER 5
INTRODUCTION TO NTRU CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM AND
PROPOSED WORK
This chapter provides a brief description of the NTRU encryption and signature
algorithm, and the proposed work of using NTRU for SCADA security.
Critical Infrastructure using SCADA system incorporates millions of electronic
devices and users. To meet the cyber security requirements, every node/device in the
SCADA system must have at least basic cryptographic functions, such as symmetric
and asymmetric cryptographic primitives, to perform data encryption and
authentication. This thesis is intended to provide a secure and faster cryptographic
solution for SCADA system security using NTRU lattice based asymmetric
cryptographic algorithm.
5.1 Introduction to NTRU
NTRU is a public key cryptosystem (PKCS) and an IEEE 1363.1 and X9.98
standard [APPENDIX I]. It was first published in 1996 by J.Hoffstein, J.Pipher and
Silverman. That same year, the developers of NTRU joined with D. Lieman and
founded the NTRU Cryptosystems, Inc., and were given a patent on the
cryptosystem. In 2009, the company was acquired by Security Innovation, a software
security company. It uses lattice based cryptography to encrypt and decrypt data.
NTRU is based on algebraic structures of certain polynomial rings. The hard
problem on which NTRU is based is the Short Vector Problem (finding a short
vector in lattice). It consists of two algorithms: NTRUEncrypt, which is used for
encryption, and NTRUSign, which is used for digital signatures. NTRU encryption
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is proposed as a public-key encryption enabling high-speed processing. The NTRU
encryption performs encryption and decryption by polynomial operations that can be
implemented at higher speeds, as compared to RSA encryption that carries out
modulo exponentiation under a certain rule and ECC that performs scalar
multiplication for points on an elliptic curve. Another added advantage is
unlike RSA and ECC, NTRU is not known to be vulnerable to quantum
computer based attacks.
5.2 NTRU Public Key Cryptosystem
NTRU stands for nth degree Truncated Ring polynomial Unit. NTRU is a relatively
new Public Key Cryptosystem (PKCS) that uses lattice-based cryptography to
encrypt and decrypt data. The algorithm is based on embedding messages in a
polynomial ring, R. The ring R consists of truncated polynomials of degree N-1
having integer coefficients that are reduced modulo certain parameters, after every
math operation. The notation for the Ring is given as:
R= Z[X] / (XN-1)
Where Z represents the set of integers and N is 1 more than the degree of the
polynomial. A full mathematical explanation is beyond the scope of this thesis and
the reader is referred to the literature for an in-depth analysis of NTRU
cryptography.
A brief explanation of the algorithm is as follows:
5.2.1 NTRU Parameters
NTRU PKCS is specified by a number of parameters and keys as shown in table 5.1
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NTRU
Parameter
N

Explanation
The polynomials in the truncated polynomial ring have degree N-1 (Nonsecret)

q

Large modulus: The coefficients of the truncated polynomials will be
reduced mod q. (Non-secret)

p

Small modulus: The coefficients of the message are reduced to mod p
(Non secret)

f

A polynomial that is the private key (Secret)

g

A polynomial that is used to generate the public key h from f (Secret but
discarded after initial use)

h

A polynomial that is the public key

r

The random “blinding polynomial. (Secret but discarded after initial use)

k

A security parameter which controls resistance to certain types of attacks,
including plaintext awareness.

df

The polynomial f has df coefficients equal to 1, (df-1) coefficients equal to
-1, and the rest equal to 0.

dg

The polynomial g has dg coefficients equal to 1, dg coefficients equal to -1,
and the rest equal to 0.

dr

The polynomial r has dr coefficients equal to 1, dr coefficients equal to -1,
and the rest equal to 0.

Table 5.1 NTRU Parameters and Keys

5.2.2 Key Generation
Bob wants to create a public/private key pair for the NTRU public key
cryptosystem.


Bob chooses 2 random “small” polynomials f and g in the defined ring R A
“small” polynomial is relative to a random polynomial mod q, i.e., the
coefficients are much smaller than q.
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Bob then computes the inverse of f modulo q and the inverse of f modulo p.
The inverses are denoted as fq and fp respectively.
f*fq = 1 (modulo q) and f*fp = 1(modulo p)
Bob should select f such that its inverses fq and fp exists.



Bob computes the product, h= pfq * g (modulo q).



Bob’s private key is the pair of polynomials f and fp. Bob’s public key is the
polynomial h.

5.2.3 Encryption
Alice wants to send a message to Bob using Bob’s public key h.


Alice converts her message in the form of a polynomial m whose coefficients are
chosen modulo p, between –p/2 and p/2 ( m is a small polynomial modulo q)



Alice randomly chooses a random polynomial r. This is the “blinding value”,
which is used to obscure the message.



Alice computes the polynomial e = pr * h + m (modulo q).



The polynomial e is the encrypted message which Alice sends to Bob.

5.2.4 Decryption
Bob on receiving Alice’s encrypted message e, wants to decrypt it.


Bob uses his private polynomial f to compute a = f * e (modulo q). Since Bob is
computing a modulo q, he chooses the coefficients of a to lie between –q/2 and
q/2.



Bob next computes the polynomial b = a (modulo p) reducing each of the
coefficients of a modulo p.



Bob uses his other private polynomial fp to compute c = fp * b (modulo p).
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Polynomial c will be Alice’s original message m.

5.2.5 Example
Let N = 11, q = 32, p = 3, df = 4, dg = 3.
Bob needs to choose a polynomial f of degree 10 with four 1’s and three -1’s, and he
needs to choose a polynomial g of degree 10 with three 1’s and three -1’s. Suppose
he chooses:
f = -1 + X + X2 – X4 + X6 + X9 – X10
g = -1 + X2 + X3 + X5 – X8 – X10
Next Bob computes the inverse fp of f modulo p and the inverse fq of f modulo q
He finds that:
fp = 1 + 2X + 2X3 + 2X4 + X5 + 2X7 + X8 + 2X9
fq = 5 + 9X + 6X2 + 16X3 + 4X4 + 15X5 + 16X6 + 22X7 + 20X8 + 18X9 + 30X10
The final step in key creation is to compute the product
h = pfq * g = 8 + 25X + 22X2 + 20X3 + 12X4 + 24X5 + 15X6 + 19X7 + 12X8 + 19X9
+ 16X10 (modulo 32)
Bob’s private key is the pair of polynomials f and fp and his public key is the
polynomial h.
For the purposes of this tutorial, let dr = 3. Now, suppose Alice wants to send the
message,
m = -1 + X3 – X4 – X8 + X9 + X10
to Bob using Bob’s public key,
h = 8 + 25X + 22X2 + 20X3 + 12X4 + 24X5 + 15X6 + 19X7 + 12X8 + 19X9 + 16X10
(modulo 32)
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She first chooses a random polynomial r of degree 10 with three 1’s and three -1’s.
Say she chooses,
r = -1 + X2 + X3 + X4 – X5 – X7
Then her encrypted message e is,
e = r*h+m = 14 + 11X + 26X2 + 24X3 + 14X4 + 16X5 + 30X6 +7X7 + 25X8 + 6X9 +
19X10 (modulo 32)
Alice sends the encrypted message e to Bob.
Upon decryption, he uses his private key f to compute,
a = f*e = 3 -7X -10X2 -11X3 + 10X4 + 7X5 + 6X6 + 7X7 + 5X8 – 3X9 -7X10 (modulo
32)
Note that when Bob reduces the coefficients of f*e modulo 32, he chooses values
lying between -15 and 16, not between 0 and 31. It is very important that he chooses
the co-efficient in this way. Next Bob reduces the coefficients of a modulo 3 to get,
b = a = -X –X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X7 –X8 –X10 (modulo 3)
Finally Bob uses fp , the other part of his private key, to compute
c = fp * b = -1 + X3 –X4 –X8 + X9 + X10 (modulo 3)
The polynomial c is Alice’s message m, so Bob has successfully decrypted Alice’s
message.
5.2.6 Theoretical Operating Specifications
This section gives an overview of the theoretical operating characteristics of the
NTRU PKCS. There are four integer parameters (N, P, Q, and K) as described
before. The following table 5.2 summarizes the NTRU PKCS characteristics in
terms of these parameters.
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Plain Text Block

(N-K) log2P bits

Encrypted Text Block

N log2Q bits

Encryption Speed

O(N2) operations

Decryption Speed

O(N2) operations

Private Key Length

2Nlog2P bits

Public Key Length

Nlog2Q bits

Table 5.2 NTRU PKCS operating characteristics

5.3 NTRU Signature Scheme
Digital signature schemes are a type of public-key encryption that is used for
identifying a sender and preventing data falsification when data is sent from a
receiving machine/client to a machine/client. The transmitting client creates
signature data for data desired to be transmitted using a private key of the
transmitting client, and then transmits the signature data to the receiving client
together with the desired data. The receiving client performs a verification of the
signature data using a public key corresponding to the private key of the transmitting
apparatus to judge whether the desired data has been falsified .It is difficult to
calculate a value of the private key from the public key.
In the key generation under the NTRUSign signature scheme, the private key and
the public key are generated by using multiple elements in a polynomial ring R with
integer coefficients and an ideal of the ring R modulo polynomial XN-1. For
generating a signature under the NTRUSign signature scheme for a message, the
generated private key and 2N- dimensional vector, which is a hash value of the
message, are used. For the signature verification of the NTRUSign signature
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scheme, the public key, the signature of the message, and the 2N- dimensional
vector are used. A full mathematical explanation is beyond the scope of this paper
and the reader is referred to the literature [10] for an in-depth analysis of NTRU
Signature scheme.
5.4 Advantages of NTRU over other PKCS
The benefits of using NTRU has been listed below which makes it a right choice for
application in SCADA environment.


NTRU has been observed to be multiple times faster than RSA and ECC.



It consumes minimal resources including CPU and battery.



Significantly reduces server resource utilization for large-scale deployments.



Improves the data throughput(over RSA) when integrated with SSL



Ideal for low power or hard to access environments, for embedded devices
where code size is a major limitation.



Resistant to Quantum computing attacks.

5.5 Proposed Work
This section provides a brief description about the issues with cryptographic
solutions in SCADA with previous approaches to handle it and the proposed work.
5.5.1 Issue & Previous Approaches
Security standards for SCADA protocols such as IEC 62351 and AGA-12 explicitly
specify the use of RSA & ECC based digital signature schemes for providing
authentication, data-integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation. Due to the
practical difficulties in implementing RSA digital signature scheme in limited
environment, the security community is making significant efforts to design an
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alternative solution. HMAC [21] and HORS [22] are two such alternatives designed.
However they have their own limitations. HMAC does not provide true data-origin
authentication and HORS implementation requires a large public key size on the
order of 10 KB, resulting in non-negligible overhead for both communication and
storage. Although ECC based authentication mechanisms can provide better
performance results when compared to RSA, in practical it is better to consider
algorithms faster than ECC for real-time applications. Considering these issues, we
propose the use of light-weighted and faster NTRU asymmetric cryptosystem [9 and
10] into SCADA systems for use in encryption and digital signature. No previous
research work suggests the use of NTRU as asymmetric algorithm in SCADA
communication.
5.5.2 Proposed Approach
In our proposed approaches for encryption and authentication, NTRU is considered
as the asymmetric cryptography. NTRU is chosen over RSA or ECC because it not
only necessitates less power consumption and computation, but also reduced
amounts of data transmitted and stored. Experiments conducted previously reveal
that NTRU delivers substantial performance and size advantages over its
competitors running multiple times faster while consuming minimal resources
including CPU and battery [23 and 24]. Unlike RSA and ECC, NTRU is not known
to be vulnerable to quantum computer based attacks. All these factors make it an
ideal choice for its use in SCADA systems/devices working under a limited
environment.
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The proposed Encryption and Authentication mechanisms in SCADA system
include Certificate Creation I as its first phase where the key-generation operation
and certificate issuance takes place.
5.5.2.1 Key Generation and Certificate Creation
To implement asymmetric/public-key cryptography in SCADA systems for
providing a secure communication on an in-secure public network, it requires the
use of digital certificates to verify the identity of the SCADA device/client machine.
A public-key infrastructure (PKI) [25] is a system for the creation, storage, and
distribution of digital certificates which are used to verify that a particular public key
belongs to a certain entity. Every device/client machine in SCADA system that
involves in transmitting messages has to create a NTRU private and public key pair
using the NTRU key generation algorithm and stores it in the local key store.
Administrators of these devices/machines direct a Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
to the organization’s physically protected Certificate Authority (CA). CA which is a
part of PKI system signs the CSR after analyzing the requester and then
issues digital certificates that contain a public key and the identity of the owner. The
public key is publicly made available to all parties with whom the requester
communicates or it is exchanged during communication. This certificate is then used
for encryption and authentication purposes. Figure 5.1 shows the steps involved in
creating a NTRU digital certificate.
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Figure 5.1 Key Generation and Certificate Creation

For SCADA applications involving real-time traffic, certificate exchange is not
done as part of the messages; the digital certificates must be pre-installed on the
receiving nodes.
5.5.2.2 NTRU Encryption mechanism in SCADA communication
The NTRU algorithm performs encryption and decryption by polynomial operations
that can be implemented at higher speeds, as compared to RSA encryption that
carries out modulo exponentiation under a certain rule and an elliptic curve
cryptosystem that performs scalar multiplication for points on an elliptic curve.
Hence, the NTRU encryption in SCADA achieves higher-speed processing than
conventional public-key encryption, and is also capable of performing, when used in
software processing, the processing in a practical period of time.
In order to ensure data-integrity, SCADA messages have to be encrypted when
they are transmitted. In this proposed mechanism, the messages are encoded into a
truncated polynomial ring R. When a SCADA device/client “A” wishes to transmit
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message/control signals to another device/client “B”, “A” uses the public key of “B”
published by the Certificate Authority to encrypt the encoded message to create a
cipher message. On the receiving end, “B” decrypts the cipher message using its
own private key to obtain the original message. Figure 5.2 shows how encryption
and decryption of SCADA message is done using NTRU asymmetric keys.

Figure 5.2 Encrypting and decrypting SCADA messages with NTRU Keys

For SCADA communication involving lengthy message transmission, the NTRU
asymmetric encryption can be used to distribute the secret symmetric session keys
with which the actual message encryption takes place. A detailed explanation of it
can be seen in Figure 5.3
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Figure 5.3 NTRU used in distributing secret symmetric key

For each new session, a new session key will be established. This is mainly
adopted for bulk message transmission because symmetric key encryption is much
faster than asymmetric key encryption. The secret key used can be generated using
any symmetric algorithm approved by IEC 62351 such as AES, DES etc.
5.5.2.3 NTRU Based Authentication in SCADA communication
In this approach NTRU Digital Signature scheme is chosen in SCADA systems for
ensuring authenticity. The message to be transmitted is encoded into a polynomial
ring R. To verify the integrity of the data that is transmitted, the data is subjected to
non-keyed hash algorithm such as SHA-1, SHA-256 etc. The message digest
obtained by this process is signed using the sender’s NTRU private key. The
encrypted message digest is sent to the receiver along with the encoded message that
is encrypted using the receiver’s NTRU public key. Thus the sender sends 1)
Encrypted message 2) Encrypted message digest which is the digital signature.
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The receiver upon receiving them decrypts the message using its own NTRU
private key and computes the message digest using the same hash algorithm. It then
verifies the digital signature using the publicized NTRU public key of the sender and
the computed message digest. In our proposed approach, NTRU digital signature
algorithm is used rather than the slow RSA which makes it convenient for use in
SCADA applications involving real-time constraints as seen in Fig 5.4.

Figure 5.4 NTRU based Authentication in SCADA communication
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Previously, the security of real-time traffic was limited to message authentication
with no encryption specified. However since implementing NTRU digital signature
takes less time compared to its RSA counterpart, encryption can also be specified for
such applications with real-time constraints ensuring data-integrity of the message as
well. We can even consider a hybrid approach that uses NTRU for digital signature
and a symmetric key (such as AES, DES) for encryption purpose.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENTATION AND TEST RESULTS
This chapter focuses on the experimental case study conducted on Raspberry Pi and
Intel Core machine for the comparison of NTRU asymmetric cryptosystem with
others used in SCADA system such as RSA and ECC. The first section of this
chapter gives an introduction to Raspberry Pi and the second section gives a detailed
description of the experimentation conducted and the test results observed.
6.1 Introduction to Raspberry Pi
The tests for comparing the performance of NTRU, RSA and ECC with respect to
their encryption, decryption and digital signature speeds were conducted on
Raspberry Pi. Raspberry Pi is a credit-card sized single board computer developed in
UK. It has a Broadcom BCM2835 system on a chip which includes ARMv6k 700
MHz processor. Figure 6.1 shows the Raspberry Pi kit used for experimentation.

Figure 6.1 Raspberry Pi
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There are two models of Raspberry Pi available mainly based on the size of
memory. Model B with 512 MB SDRAM @ 400 MHz was chosen for our
experimentation purpose. The Raspberry Pi was chosen to run on Debian Linux
operating system. It also supports other OS such as RISC OS, FreeBSD, NetBSD
and Plan 9. It does not include a built-in hard disk or solid-state drive, but uses an
SD card for booting and long-term storage.
6.2 Experimentation
To motivate our research, the performance characteristics of NTRU, RSA and ECC
are observed by implementing the algorithms for computation using the open source
Bouncy Castle 1.47 Java library and comparing their experimental run times. Open
JDK-7 with Cacao Virtual Machine was used for faster execution. Our experiments
were conducted on 700 MHz Raspberry Pi running Linux and Intel(R) Core(TM) i3
CPU @ 2.27GHz to facilitate performance comparison.
For the first experiment, the run times for three fundamental primitives of a
cryptosystem: encryption, decryption and key generation was chosen as comparison
parameters for the two algorithms (NTRU and RSA) for different key-sizes. The test
was done for randomly generated message of size 32 bytes. Table 6.2 and 6.3 shows
the comparison of computation times of encryption algorithms between Intel
machine and Raspberry Pi. The result shows that RSA leads to a bad performance
while generating asymmetric keys, and worst when the CPU speed is as low as 700
MHz. Also at equivalent cryptographic strength, NTRU performs costly private key
operations much faster than RSA. As key sizes increase, RSA's operations per
second decrease cubicly, whereas NTRU's operations per second decrease
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quadratically (RSA-2048 can be compared to NTRU-439, RSA-3072 can be
compared to NTRU-743). RSA Decryption is expensive because it involves modular
exponentiation of huge numbers. Though there wasn’t any huge difference in the
encryption speed between NTRU and RSA in Intel core machine, NTRU encryption
was 2-3x faster than RSA encryption. The tabular results show that NTRU would be
a better choice for encryption in SCADA systems were key management of
symmetric keys become difficult.

Asymmetric
Algorithm

Key Generation
(ms)

Encryption
(ms)

Decryption
(ms)

RSA-1024

21.27

0.45

1.25

RSA-2048

90.51

0.52

3.03

RSA-3072

233.68

0.59

9.48

NTRU-439

6.27

0.28

0.22

NTRU-743

9.94

0.32

0.25

Table 6.1 Comparison of Key Generation, Encryption and Decryption speed on
Intel Core @ 2.27 GHz

Asymmetric
Algorithm

Key
Generation
(ms)

Encryption
(ms)

Decryption
(ms)

RSA-1024

3701.53

9.23

160.55

RSA-2048

24714.24

72.80

1123.98

RSA-3072

69522.21

172.23

3618.86

NTRU-439

1173.29

15.98

20.59

NTRU-743

2970.41

160.35

46.12

Table 6.2 Comparison of Key Generation, Encryption and Decryption speed on
Raspberry Pi @ 700 MHz
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Secondly, the performance of RSA, ECC and NTRU digital signature schemes
were compared using Java. After performing several tests, the average time taken for
signing and verification for various algorithms can be seen in Table 6.4. Clearly the
total time taken by NTRU signature scheme is apparently very less when compared
to RSA and ECC making it an appropriate choice for providing authentication in
SCADA systems with real-time constraints.

Asymmetric
Algorithm

Signing speed (ms)

Verification
Speed (ms)

Intel
Core

Rasp.
Pi

Intel
Core

Rasp.
Pi

Total Digital
Signature Speed
(ms) (~)
Intel
Rasp.
Core
Pi

RSA-2048
RSA-3072

40.47
63.37

1324
3962.9

1.64
1.97

48.81
85.34

42
65

1372
4048

ECDSA-256

9.41

437.3

4.48

336.7

13

773

ECDSA-512

21.55

926.5

6.30

468.8

27

1394

NTRU-439

5.16

402.6

4.18

206.4

9

608

NTRU-739

6.23

532.4

5.74

396.2

12

928

Table 6.3 Comparison of Signing and Verification speed on
Intel Core @ 2.27GHz and on Raspberry Pi @ 700 MHz

6.3 Test Results
The following results were observed based on the experimentation conducted.
Figure 6.2 shows the performance of RSA and NTRU key generation operation on
Raspberry Pi. The time taken for generating the private and public key for each
algorithm with different key sizes is represented as a bar graph. Results indicate that
RSA key generation is 20 to 25 times slower than the corresponding NTRU key
generation operation for the same level of security.
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Figure 6.2 Performance Comparison of RSA and NTRU Key Generation

Based on the encryption and decryption runtimes of NTRU and RSA on Raspberry
Pi, Figure 6.3 shows the graphical comparison of their total runtime for different key
sizes of NTRU and RSA. Observed results show that total time taken for encryption
and decryption by RSA is 18 to 33 times more than that of NTRU for the same level
of security.

Figure 6.3 Performance Comparison of RSA and NTRU Encryption and
Decryption

The experimental evaluation of digital signature schemes of all three algorithm
results in the following graph. Figure 6.4 shows the number of operations that can be
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performed per second of each algorithm based on the Intel core results. Clearly
NTRU based digital signature scheme takes less time when compared to its
counterparts for the same level of security.

Figure 6.4 Number of Digital Signature operations per second of RSA, ECC
and NTRU
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In previous sections we summarized the need for securing SCADA communication
and about the practical difficulties in implementing the currently used cryptographic
standards (such as RSA) in applications involving real-time constraints and devices
with hardware limitations. Thus it becomes necessary and useful to devise an
alternative asymmetric cryptography solution to enable end-to-end security in all
SCADA systems/devices irrespective of any constraints.
In this research, a new alternative solution for the above said issue was proposed
by employing NTRU-based encryption and authentication schemes in SCADA that
addresses the Data-Integrity, Confidentiality, Authentication and Non-repudiation
issues. The performance evaluation of different asymmetric algorithm such as RSA,
NTRU and ECC was done in Java. Their encryption, decryption and key-generation
speeds were compared. The results show that cryptographic operations of NTRU are
indeed faster than RSA & ECC for the same level of security (around 2 to 10 times
faster). The time taken for RSA and NTRU digital signature algorithm was
compared along with the time for encrypting and decrypting data using the hybrid
solution. While a more optimized version of NTRU in C would yield faster times
when compared to its counterparts’ optimized version. Since NTRU is not based on
any factorization or discrete logarithmic problems allowing it to achieve high speeds
with the use of minimal computing power. This shows that usage of a light-weight
asymmetric key protocol like NTRU is necessary for supporting a secure and faster
real-time critical application in SCADA systems.
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To further motivate our research, in the future we intend to integrate and compare
the performances of these cryptographic operations in real-time SCADA protocols
and to evaluate the results in a simulated SCADA device.
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